Does Moral Psychology Have Anything to Teach Moral Philosophy?

PHIL 4010: Senior Seminar

Professor Ron Mallon

Topic List 1:

1. Hume claims that we cannot derive an ought from an is. In contrast, John Searle argues that we can. Who is right? Consider Searle’s arguments in light of criticisms by Flew and others.

2. McDowell argues that to have one virtue, one must have them all. Assess McDowell’s argument, and then consider whether the success of such an argument makes virtue theory more or less plausible. You may wish to discuss the empirical evidence Doris considers.

3. In Chapter 3, Doris argues that a number of important experiments in social psychology should make us skeptical about the existence of the virtue of compassion. However, a number of critics have pointed out, the mere fact that we can produce an experiment in which a virtue is not exhibited does not mean the virtue does not exist, but only that the virtue is not operative in this circumstance. What kind of defense can Doris offer against this charge? Is it any good?

4. Sreenivasan distinguishes between the claims of virtue theory and those of personality (or personological) psychology, and he argues that a successful situationist critique of the latter does not undermine the former. Explain this distinction and assess its success.

5. Sreenivasan argues that an account of virtue’s that takes into account the agent’s construal of the situation might result in cross-situationally successful virtue traits. Doris, however, attacks such an approach (in Chp. 4). Assess Doris’s argument in light of the considerations Sreenivasan offers.

6. Maria Merritt offers an alternative account of the aims of virtue theory. Does such an account undermine Doris’s critique?