PHIL
3440: Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Final
Examination
1.
The final test will be Friday December 15, 2006 from
10:30 AM to Noon. (Though the exam
is scheduled for 2 full hours, we will take only 90 minutes to complete it).
2.
You must bring a LARGE blue book to class to write the
exam.
3.
The test will be comprised of 3 questions, CHOSEN AT
RANDOM ON THE DAY OF THE TEST, from the list below. You must answer TWO QUESTIONS. (This means you should prepare an answer for FOUR
questions.)
4.
NB: Questions below require choosing material (for example, choosing one argument from
several possibilities). For
example, you should not try to answer question 4 by summarizing Buller's entire
discussion. Rather, you should
choose and assess the best evidence for and against the view that there are
domain-specific, modular adaptations for cheater detection.
5.
The exam will be closed book, closed notes.
6.
You will be allowed one 4x6 inch note card of
notes. The note card may have
writing/printing on both sides.
1. Jerry Fodor argues that central systems are not modular. Explain at least one of his arguments, and assess it in light of at least one contrary reason.
2. Evolutionary psychologists offer general theoretical arguments for the claim that the mind is comprised of a great many domain-specific modules that are adaptations for solving problems in our evolutionary environment. Consider one or two of these arguments, and consider Buller's responses. Who is right?
3. Evolutionary psychologists employ specific experimental evidence to argue that the mind has innate, domain specific modules designed for social exchange (specifically, designed for "cheater detection"). Buller reviews the evidence for this conclusion and argues against it. Briefly, present and assess the case for and against domain-specific, modular adaptations for cheater detection.
4. David Buller suggests that results from "false-belief tasks" do not show there is a Theory of Mind Module. Explain what a false belief task is, and assess one or more of the arguments regarding the existence of a theory of mind module.
5. Haidt and Bargh suggest that we frequently do things without really knowing how or why. Describe two experiments that they take to show this, and explain why they think they support this conclusion. Are they right?