PHIL 4010: Senior Seminar

Experimental Philosophy

Professor Ron Mallon                                                                                                 T 2-5 OSH 334

 

Texts:                                                                                          Readings as assigned.  Reserve Link.

                                                                                                                There is no course textbook to purchase.

 

Your Instructor:                                                       Ron Mallon

 

Contact Information:                                       rmallon@philosophy.utah.edu

                                                                                                               

Office:                                                                                        Rm. 341 OSH

                                                                                                                801-585-5810

 

Office Hours:                                                                 Thursday 1-2PM, and by appointment

 

Course Assessment:  Assessment for the course will be based on the following:

(1)     Papers: Two papers (5-7 pages each) (30% each):

á             First, Due: Friday, October 5th Tuesday, October, 17.  Assignment

á             Second Due: Tuesday, December 11th.  Assignment

(2)    Responses to weekly readings:

á             Each week, a short assignment (no more than 1 page) will be due.  It may involve producing written questions, or responding to written questions, or summarizing an argument.  The purpose of the assignment is to ensure that you have engaged the assigned material seriously and carefully.

á             No late responses will be accepted without prior arrangement or very good excuse (including documentation).

á             We have 14 weeks of assigned readings, so there will be 14 assignments.  Students may skip 3 assignments, no questions asked, no excuses necessary.

 

Course Topic:  Is philosophy characterized by a distinctive method?  By distinctive questions?  Are the questions, methods, or findings of philosophy autonomous from those of other disciplines?  These questions have recently come to the fore with in the wake of a movement sometimes called experimental philosophy.

     Experimental philosophers are characterized by (1) the view that contingent, empirical facts about the world matter to our philosophical arguments (naturalism), and (2) the attempt to actually discover the facts relevant to philosophical controversies via scientific experimentation.  This course will be a survey of recent work in experimental philosophy, along with some of the more traditional work it responds to as well as criticisms of the experimental philosophy program.

 

 

Introduction

Tuesday, August 21: Introduction to Experimental Philosophy

 

Tuesday August 28:  On Conceptual Analysis (reserve)

Questions 1

Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe, "An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto"

Frank Jackson, "PrŽcis of from Metaphysics to Ethics"

Stephen Stich and Jonathan Weinberg, "Jackson's Empirical Assumptions"

Frank Jackson, "Responses"  (Only response to Stich and Weinberg are required.)

 

Intuitions and Cultural Diversity (reserve)

Tuesday, September 4:  Intuitional Diversity

Stephen Stich, "Precis of Fragmentation of Reason"

Nisbett, R.E., & Norenzayan, A. "Culture and cognition."

 

Tuesday, September 11:  Epistemic Diversity (reserve)

Edmund Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?"

Jonathan M. Weinberg, Stephen Stich, & Shaun Nichols, "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions"

Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich, and Jonathan M. Weinberg "Meta-Skpeticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology"

 

Tuesday, September 18: Semantic Diversity (reserve)

Saul Kripke, Lecture II from Naming and Necessity

Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich, "Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style"

Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols, & Stephen Stich, "Against Arguments from Reference"

 

Tuesday, September 25th: Framing Effects (reserve)

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, "Framing Moral Intuitions"

Stacey Swain, Joshua Alexander, and Jonathan Weinberg, "The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions:  Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp"

Weekly Assignment+Paper Assignment

 

Tuesday, October 2nd:  Ex Phi Critics (reserve)

Ernest Sosa, "Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition."   

Antti Kauppinen, "The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy"

Kirk Ludwig, "The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches"

 

Recommended:

George Bealer, "Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy"

 

 

Tuesday, October, 9th: Fall Break

 

Tuesday, October 16th:  Moral Dilemmas & Trolley Problems (reserve)

 J.J. Thomson, "The Trolley Problem"

Greene, J.D., Sommerville, R.B., Nystrom, L.E., Darley, J.M., & Cohen, J.D. An fMRI investigation of     emotional engagement in moral judgment"

                        

Tuesday, October 23rd: Emotions and Moral Judgment (reserve)

Haidt, J., Koller, S., & Dias, M. "Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog?"

Haidt, J. "The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment."

 

 

 

Tuesday, October 30th:  The Knobe Effect

Joshua Knobe, "Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language."

Fred Adams and Annie Steadman, "Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding?"

Thomas Nadelhoffer, "On Praise, Side Effects, and Folk Ascriptions of Intentionality."

Recommended: Shaun Nichols and Joseph Ulatowski, "Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited"

 

 

Tuesday, November 6th: Free Will (reserve)

E. Nahmias, S. Morris, T. Nadelhoffer, J. Turner, "Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?" 

Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe, "Moral Responsibility and Determinism"

 

 

Tuesday, November 13th: Free Will (reserve)

Robert Woolfolk, John Doris, John Darley, "Identification, Situational Constraint, and Social Cognition"

Adina Roskies, "Neuroscientific Challenges to Free Will and Responsibility"

 

Tuesday, November 20th: Xphi and Phil Sci (reserve)

Karola Stotz and Paul Griffiths, "How scientists conceptualize genes: An empirical study"

 

Tuesday, November 27th: Xphi and Innateness (reserve)

Mallon and Weinberg, "Innateness as Closed Process Invariance"

Griffiths, Machery, Lindquist, "The Vernacular Concept of Innateness"

Assignment Two

 

Tuesday, December 4th:  Causation (reserve)

Christopher Hitchcock, "Three Concepts of Causation"

Tania Lambrozo, "The Structure and Function of Explanations"

 

Attendance

Attendance is not mandatory, but you are responsible for the material presented in class.  I am not responsible for representing material to you that you have missed, and I will not do so.  If you are absent, take responsibility for getting notes from a classmate.

 

Late policy 

Late work will be accepted and penalized penalized.  If you have a planned absence or a conflict with another class, make arrangements with me in advance to avoid penalty.  If you have an unexpected emergency (e.g. the death of a loved one or a medical problem), plan to present me with documentation of it.  Unexcused late work will be penalized at the rate of 1 letter grade per week, up to a maximum of two full letter grades.

 

Plagiarism

"Plagiarism" means the intentional unacknowledged use or incorporation of any other person's work in, or as a basis for, one's own work offered for academic consideration or credit for public presentation.  Plagiarism is punishable by a penalty not to exceed a failing grade in the class.  It is my own policy, repeatedly and consistently applied in the past, to award a failing grade for the class for any substantial instance of plagiarism. 

http://www.admin.utah.edu/ppmanual/8/8-10.html#SECTION V.

 

The American with Disabilities Act 

The University of Utah seeks to provide equal access to its programs, services and activities for people with disabilities. If you will need accommodations in the class, reasonable prior notice needs to be given to the Center for Disability Services, 162 Olpin Union Building, 581-5020 (V/TDD). CDS will work with you and the instructor to make arrangements for accommodations.

 

Policy concerning accommodation of religious beliefs:

There will be no accommodation for religious beliefs.   University policy can be found here:

http://www.admin.utah.edu/facdev/accommodations-policy.pdf

 

Official policy governing grade appeals: 

http://www.admin.utah.edu/ppmanual/8/8-10.html#SECTION IV 

 

Drop/Withdrawal Policy

http://www.sa.utah.edu/regist/registration/withdrawal/withdrawal1.htm

Bibliography

Adams, F. and A. Steadman (2004). "Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding." Analysis 64: 173-181.

 

Bealer, G. (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. M. R. DePaul and W. Ramsey, Rowman and Littlefield: 201-239.

                       

Gettier, E. (1963). "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge." Analysis 23: 121-123.

                       

Greene, J. D., R. B. Sommerville, et al. (2001). "An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment." Science 293: 2105-2108.

                       

Griffiths, P., E. Machery, et al. (under review). "The Vernacular Concept of Innateness."

                       

Haidt, J. (2001). "The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment " Psychological Review 108: 814-834.

                       

Haidt, J., S. Koller, et al. (1993). "Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog?" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65: 613-628.

                       

Hitchcock, C. (2007). "Three Concepts of Causation." Philosophy Compass 2(3): 508-516.

 

Jackson, F. (2001). "PrŽcis of From Metaphysics to Ethics." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(3): 617-624.

                       

Jackson, F. (2001). "Responses." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(3): 653-664.

                       

Kauppinen, A. (2007). "The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy." Philosophical Explorations 10(2): 95-118.

                       

Knobe, J. (2003). "Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language." Analysis 63: 190-193.

                       

Kripke, S. A. (1972). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.

                       

Lombrozo, T. (2006). "The structure and function of explanations." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10(10): 464-470.

 

Ludwig, Kirk.  2007.  "The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches."  Midwest Studies in Philosophy.  Volume XXXI.  pp. 128-159.

                       

Machery, E., R. Mallon, et al. (2004). "Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style." Cognition 92: B1-B12.

                       

Mallon, R., E. Machery, et al. (under review). "Against Arguments from Reference."

                       

Mallon, R. and J. Weinberg (2006). "Innateness as Closed Process Invariance." Philosophy of Science 73: 323-344.

                       

Nadelhoffer, T. (2004). "Blame, badness, and intentional action: A reply to Knobe and Mendlow." The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24: 259-269.

                       

Nadelhoffer, T. (2004). "Praise, side effects, and intentional action." The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24: 196-213.

 

Nahmias, E. A., S. G. Morris, et al. (forthcoming). "Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

                       

Nichols, S. and J. Knobe (forthcoming). Experimental Philosophy: A Manifesto.

                       

Nichols, S. (forthcoming). "The Rise of Compatibilism: A Case Study in the Quantitative History of Philosophy." Midwest Studies in Philosophy.

                       

Nichols, S. and J. Knobe (forthcoming). "Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions." Nous.

                       

Nichols, S., S. P. Stich, et al. (2003). Metaskepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology. The Skeptics. S. Luper. Burlington, VT, Ashgate.

                       

Nichols, S. and J. Ulatowski (forthcoming). "Intuitions and individual differences: The Knobe effect revisited." Mind and Language.

                       

Nisbett, R. E. and A. Norenzayan (2002). Culture and Cognition. Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology, Volume Two: Memory and Cognitive Processes, 3rd Edition. D. Medin and H. Pashler. New York, John Wilely & Sons: 561-597.

                       

Roskies, A. (2006). "Neuroscientific Challenges to Free Will and Responsibility." Trends in Cognitive Science 10(9): 419-424.

                       

Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (forthcoming). Framing Moral Intuitions. Moral Psychology. W. Sinnott-Armstrong. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 2: 47-107.

                       

Sosa, E. (2007). "Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition." Philosophical Studies 132(1): 99-107.

                       

Stich, S. (1991). "The Fragmentation of Reason: Precis of Two Chapters." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LI(1): 179-183.

                       

Stich, S. and J. Weinberg (2001). "Jackson's Empirical Assumptions." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(3): 637-643.

                       

Stotz, K., P. E. Griffiths, et al. (2004). "How scientists conceptualize genes: An empirical study." Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences(December).

                       

Swain, S., J. Alexander, et al. (forthcoming). "The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold On True Temp."

                       

Weinberg, J., S. Nichols, et al. (2001). "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions." Philosophical Topics 29(1&2): 429-459.

                       

Woolfolk, R. L., J. M. Doris, et al. (2006). "Identification, Situational Constraint, and Social Cognition." Cognition 100(2): 283-301.