Fall 2007 Cognitive Science Exam Mallon

TAKE HOME EXAM INSTRUCTIONS:

(1) Answer each question below carefully and completely.

(2) Bold faced questions require substantive evaluation of open theoretical questions.

(3) Answers should be typed and double-spaced, with a 12 pt. font.

(4) THE TAKE_HOME EXAM WILL BE DUE FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14th in 341 OSH by 4PM.

(5) The take-home exam takes the place of both the final paper and the final exam.

IN-CLASS EXAM INSTRUCTIONS:

Please email me at rmallon@philosophy.utah.edu by Friday, December 7th, if you intend to take the in-class option.

(1) The in-class exam will be comprised of questions similar to those below. Study the questions below to prepare for the exam.

(2) The exam will be Thursday, December 13, from 8-10 AM.

(3) Final papers are due Friday, December 14 by 4pm in 341 OSH. Some sample topics are here.

(4) Bring a BLUE BOOK to take the final exam.

1. In the Modularity of Mind, Fodor distinguishes four accounts of the structure of the mind. Consider a hypothetical mental structure m which is an instance of a vertical faculty, and do the following:

(a) Explain how m's being a vertical faculty distinguishes it from being an instance of the other three accounts.

(b) Suggest the sort of evidence that would be relevant to ruling out each of the other accounts of mental structure. What kind of evidence might lead us to conclude that m is a vertical faculty?

2. Earlier in the semester, we discussed Fodor's defense of folk psychology and of the language of thought hypothesis. We subsequently discussed his view of the modular structure of the mind. Prima facie, however, these views are quite different. The former emphasizes reasoning, representation, and computation while the latter emphasizes automatic processes with barriers to information flow. Briefly explain how these two views of the mind go together in Fodor's thought.

3. Briefly explain each of the following properties of modules:

(a) mandatory

(b) informationally encapsulated

(c) shallow outputs

4. Fodor offers two main arguments for why central systems are not modular. Recapitulate and consider each.

5. Frank Keil suggests that empiricists have little to fear from Fodor's book, but implies they may have more to fear from his own work on folk biology. Explain why.

6. If children operate with an innately specified folk biology rather than making judgments on the basis of phenomenal similarity, then why do children's judgments so often seem to be similarity based?

7. Carefully explain two experiments that Keil takes to show the presence of innate, domain-specific biological knowledge in children. Imagine what an empiricist critic of Keil might say in reply, and assess the strength of that conclusion.

8. In what ways (if any) does Keil's experimental work show that parts of Fodor's "Central Systems" are in fact modular? In what ways does it fall short of this? How might Fodor respond?

9. John Bargh and Tanya Chartrand offer an argument that most of our behavior must be under the control of automatic (rather than conscious) mechanisms. Recapitulate and assess this argument.

10. Bargh and Chartrand suggest that context may act via automatic processes to activate processes that "bypass the will entirely." Explain one experiment that is supposed to show this, and assess whether it does.

11. Evolutionary Psychologists cast debates over human nature as pitting themselves against the "Standard Social Science Model" or SSSM. SSSM advocates, on their rendering, think innate proclivities have little role to play in understanding human psychology. Briefly (say, in less than 1 page) recapitulate the SSSM argument for this conclusion, in your own words.

12. Tooby and Cosmides suggest that the SSSM model's case against nativism fails "to distinguish adaptationist evolutionary biology from behavior genetics." Explain what they mean by this, and put in your own words what the failure amounts to.

13. Tooby and Cosmides argue that domain-general architectures for problem solving suffer from "combinatorial explosion," and cannot, therefore, explain our success in negotiating the real problems of our ancestral (and current environments). Explain this argument.

14. Consider carefully one or more considerations Tooby and Cosmides provide for the argument that the mind must be largely comprised of domain-specific problem solving mechanisms. Do these arguments show that parts of Fodor's "Central Systems" are in fact modular? Explain why or why not, and consider how Fodor might respond.