Question Set 1:

Below are topic suggestions for papers. You may also choose your own topic, though you should clear it with one or both instructors first. Papers should be 3-5 pages in length and are due Tuesday 17 February unless special arrangements have been made in advance.

1. The project of Keller's took is to challenge the notion that "The gene

is the locus of structure, function and causal agency"(p. 46). The

traditional roles assigned to the genes - replication, production of

proteins, and the stability of organismal development - are products of

"dynamic processes" or "distributed programs" or "developmental

stability". However, Keller acknowledges that the above notion has been

enormously productive in 20th century biology. She writes that "one of

the great virtues of the discourse of gene action is that it permitted

geneticists to pursue their research programs so productively"(p. 50), and

that genes are useful "handles" or "operational shorthand" for

experimentation and intervention. In your view, is there a tension here in

Keller's views? Why or why not?

2. Keller argues in Chapter 3 of her book that the concept of a "genetic

program" is incoherent. What is her argument? Explain and describe the

premises and conclusion in your own words. What is the logical structure

of the argument? If possible, include examples to illustrate the

argument.

3. In your own words, reconstruct Griffiths' and Neumann Held's argument

against Waters' "molecular gene concept." Explain and describe the

structure of the argument, or the relationship between premises and

conclusion. Are there any "suppressed premises"? If so, make them

explicit. Then, raise one objection.

4. What is the distinction between Gene-P and Gene-D? In your own words,

explain and describe how and why Moss makes this distinction. What

argument does he offer for making this distinction? What is the logical

structure of the argument? Describe the premises and conclusion. Then,

raise one objection.

5. Moss writes both that:

To speak of a Gene-P for a phenotype is to speak as if, but only as if,

there was a definite certain something that was transmitted between

generations and that dictated a distinct phenotypic outcome. But as we’ve

already said Gene-P is indeterminate with respect to its physical

referent. It is indeterminate with respect to its DNA sequences and so

there is not a certain something that is being transmitted, but rather an

uncertain something. How can this be? Would it not simply be a matter of

empirically fleshing out what the structure of the physical referent would

be? The answer is no.

And:

In the modern genetics clinic, traditional family pedigrees can be

supplemented or even replaced by the use of molecular probes. Molecular

probes are targeted to a specific sequence but … probes can only probe for

particular ways of not having the normal sequence and never fully rule out

the possibility of some other way of not having the normal sequence. What

genetic probes can do is to survey some set of the relevant ways that a

normal sequence may be absent.

In your own words, explain what you take Moss to be saying in the above

passages. Do you think that there is a tension in these two claims? Why

or why not? Explain your answer, and if possible, use examples to

illustrate your position.

6. Ariew discusses three views of innateness: high heritability, flat norms of reaction, and developmental canalization. He argues against the former two views and for the latter. Choose one or more arguments against the former two views, or for the latter, describe and explain the argument(s), and explain why Ariew is wrong.

7. Assess understanding innateness as canalization according to one or more of the constraints Samuels sets out on an acceptable account of innateness in the cognitive sciences. Describe and explain Samuel’s reason for endorsing the constraint, why he thinks it counts against understanding innateness as canaliztion, and consider how Ariew might respond.

8. Sober writes, “it is a reasonable hypothesis that the most that can be salvaged from the ancient concept of innateness is this: a phenotypic trait is innate for a given genotype if and only if that phenotype will emerge in all of a range of developmental environments.” He continues:

“What counts as the appropriate range of environments is left open in this proposal. Perhaps there is a uniquely correct answer to this question; then again, maybe the range is determined pragmatically. It is difficult to see how the latter conclusion can be evaded.”

Explain why Sober might be skeptical that there is a “uniquely correct answer.” Do you agree with his skepticism? Why or why not?