... Spanish¹

This paper has benefited from comments by Bertram Kienzle and Niko Strobach when I presented an earlier version at the Institute für Philosophie, Universtät Rostock in May 2002. Ram Neta and I have discussed the issue of knowing-how and knowing-that; neither of us seems able to convert the other to the `one true' view, but I thank him for the opportunity of trying. Marianna DiPaolo and David Iannucci have read several versions, and helped me see how linguists read philosophy; they are entirely blameless for any misrepresentation of linguists which the paper may contain. I would also like to thank the anonymous referees, whose comments have helped me sharpen my arguments.

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... Communication,''²

In The Seas of Language, 183-187. In this paper, I address issues raised in the Preface and the first seven essays.

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... happens.³

Ibid., pp. 186-187.

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... skill.⁴

In ``Why Knowledge is Unnecessary for Understanding Language,'' Dean Pettit argues that knowledge-that is unnecessary for understanding language. His arguments are compatible with, indeed complimentary to, mine. My argument, however, focuses on the more general thesis that the acquisition of language, as well as one's ability to employ language as a system with multiple uses and to understand specific bits of language, does not depend upon any theoretical knowledge on the language learner/user's part. I do not discuss Pettit's argument here, and do not rely on any of his conclusions to make my case.

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... it.⁵

The Seas of Language, op. cit., p. ix-x.

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... presented.⁶

``What Do I Know when I Know a Language?,'' in The Seas of Language, op. cit. p. 96.

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... theoretical.⁷

Throughout this paper, I treat Dummett as holding the view that knowledge of a language is theoretical simpliciter. I do so because any activity which has a theoretical component as a necessary condition for its performance cannot give practical knowledge (knowledge-how) anything but a peripheral role. Dummett holds that theoretical knowledge is a prerequisite of one's knowing a language, therefore, he can be so classified. This does not mean that if we come to know or discover the rules of some purely practical activity, say riding a bicycle, that all our knowledge of the activity itself suddenly assumes the status of theoretical knowledge. It is only if theoretical knowledge is required in order for someone to count as performing the activity that I classify knowledge of the skill as knowledge-that.

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... do.⁸

Ibid., p. 31.

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... right.⁹

Ibid.. pp. 28-29.

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... acting.¹⁰

In ``Knowing How,'' Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson reject the distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that, arguing instead that knowledge-how is ``simply a species of knowledge-that.'' In support of this they appeal to recent semantic theory, supplemented with the notion that propositions may have a ``practical mode of presentation.'' Their argument may seem to present a challenge for my claims here; however, even if it were correct, the actual problems are far less significant than one might antecedently imagine. The task of showing how human action is ``informed by intelligence'' still requires an account of the different ways in which this occurs. My account does this. Stanley and Williamson's arguments deserve a more detailed consideration, but this would take me well beyond the scope of this paper; therefore, I present my arguments here without attempting to address theirs, leaving that to another paper.

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... game.''¹¹

``What Do I Know When I Know a Language?'', Op. cit. p. 103.

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... implicit?¹²

Ibid., p. 103

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... excellence.''¹³

Ibid. p. 104.

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... language.¹⁴

Ibid., pp. 100-101.

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... will.¹⁵

There is a case to be made for classifying language with walking. I do not consider this here for three reasons. First, it strikes me as simply false. Second, since it is not part of Dummett's argument, there seems no reason to consider it. Third, such a move would undermine any claim that theoretical knowledge is a necessary prerequisite for the possession of language. I am developing an argument to show that Noam Chomsky is in fact guilty of this move, thus undercutting his own arguments to the contrary.

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... activities:¹⁶

This isn't the happiest bit of terminology. Any randomness here derives solely from the absence of rules and criteria applying to the activities. There is no chaos or madness associated with this category of activities. However, I'll stick with this term since it captures what Dummett is after in his argument.

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... Krausz,''¹⁷

In Interpretation and its Objects, Ritivoi, A., ed.

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...-8pt¹⁸

Ibid., p. 95.

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... component.¹⁹

To maintain the connection to Ryle's arguments, the contrast between C2 and C3 is where he engages the intellectualist.

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... C3,²⁰

One might argue that C2 collapses into C1. The discussion of swimming versus proper-swimming shows why I reject this description of the collapse.

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... proper-swimmer.²¹

I don't deny that this is a controversial claim. I hope the present arguments stand on their own, without the need of taking on the issue of rule-following in all its details. For a fuller discussion of rule following, see Word and World: Practice and the Foundations of Language, Chapter 8.

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... maze.²²

Applied to language, this alternative would entail that many seemingly competent speakers should be classified in the same group as parrots. This is a reason against this view, but I won't pursue it here.

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... meaning.²³

``What is a Theory of Meaning?(I),'' op. cit. p.22.

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... knowledge.²⁴

``What is a Theory of Meaning? (II),'',op. cit., p. 36.

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... familiar,''²⁵

Ibid. p. 223

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... counting,²⁶

Ibid. p. 223

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... repetitions.²⁷

Ibid., p. 224.

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... count.²⁸

Ibid., p. 225.

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... routine.²⁹

Ibid., p. 225.

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... there.³⁰

Ibid., p. 226.

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... things.³¹

This correction goes on long after the child leaves the explicit learning situation; it's part of engaging in a practice to be told when one gets it right or wrong.

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... detail,³²

Word and World: Practice and the Foundations of Language.

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... rules.³³

This should not be confused with Kripke's arguments in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language that the rules are the rules because we enforce them.

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... another.³⁴

Nor is it to say that we always make such corrections. Any number of things may cause me not to offer a correction in a given instance--the person may be too timid for me to want to embarrass him, or too mean for me to want to risk the bodily harm that would surely follow--but such cases do not alter how the rules of language function and are sustained.

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... mastery.³⁵

If the community were to fade away, leaving only me, I might seem to be speaking the old language, but without the judgments of others to ensure that I follow the old practices, it would soon cease to have any meaning. My situation would be even sadder than the people at §207 of the Investigations; having no one to interact with I would not even be able to give the impression that my sounds were not superfluous.

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... skill.³⁶

In fact of the cases discussed here, chess is the only that belongs in C3, though I may believe this only because I'm such a terrible chess player that I can't conceive of doing it without constantly having all the rules firmly before me.
There is a significant difference between chess, on the one hand, and measuring, counting and language,on the other. The last three all have a point, they can be put to various purposes; chess, by contrast, does not have a point, and it cannot be used by a chess player for his own purposes. Exploring the significance of this in anything approaching adequate detail is far beyond the scope of this paper. My intuition is that it is related to certain problems which I see as arising from the computational model of mind, and from trying to draw conclusions about natural languages based on features of formal systems; however, the distance between having the intuition and putting pay to it, is at least another paper long.

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... happens.''³⁷

Ibid., p. 187

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