Kripke says that according to Searle ``whatever in some sense satisfies enough or most of the family is the referent of the name'' (31). But this can't be right given what Wittgenstein has just argued.
Kripke picks up the discussion at 79--notice this is 13 sections and 6 pages AFTER the introduction of family resemblances, a lot can happen with Wittgenstein in that amount of space! Here Wittgenstein says in effect that there are many ways of getting to or at Moses. Earlier he said that there are many ways in which something can come to be counted as a game. It's not that there are a bunch of guys milling around and we go about sorting them into bunches: all the Moses's over here, the Elijah's here, the Mohammad's here, and so on. There's ONE Moses, we just locate him in a variety of ways: and by `we' here, I mean the community of language users.
In connection with games, Wittgenstein did not say (to use my earlier array) that something is a game if it ``has most (or enough) of the properties ABCDEFGHIJKLM.'' What he said was that we count something as a game if it is enough like the sorts of things that we do count as games. Which properties the things we call ``games'' happen to have isn't the issue; we could study this, make lists of properties which ``games'' have, but that isn't doing linguistics or philosophy of language, it's doing something else in social sciences. But more importantly, it would NOT tell us anything about the meaning of ``game,'' its linguistic post. Such a survey would include all sorts of features which no one supposes for a moment are relevant to language: it comes in a red box, it was purchased in Chicago, IL in 1950 as a present for Joe Kincaid's niece, and on and on. Wittgenstein's remarks are about language as used in real life, about language communities, how the idea of ``meaning'' doesn't always hold the key to sorting out some language related question, even one so seemingly tied to meaning as reference and content.
Now, what about ``Moses''? If in the case of games, meaning wasn't the key, doesn't this make Kripke's point? I think not. IF we take Wittgenstein's remarks about ``Moses'' as exactly on a par with his remarks on games, it would follow that what he is saying is that just as ``game'' has no meaning (definition, sense, reference determining set of properties associated to it), neither does ``Moses.'' Well, so far, this doesn't seem to give much succor to the Description Theorists, but let's soldier on a bit. OK, we'll take this as meaning that there is a cluster of concepts which is joined to the name ``Moses'' as its sense. Oh, the problem with this is that we've now abandoned the treatment of ``game'', where the point is that there is NO group of properties which are associated to the word.
I'm willing to cut Kripke some slack here since Searle believes that his theory finds its origin in Wittgenstein. However, once we push it and put it into the context of the Philosophical Investigations itself, we see that it does not. Moreover, we will soon see that this doesn't mean that Kripke's Millianism wins either; but that later.