Kripke's Version

Kripke sums up the Cluster Theory of Names in 6 theses and a condition

(1)

To every name or designating expression `X,' there corresponds a cluster properties, namely the family of those properties $\phi$ such that A believes `$\phi$X.

(2)

One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely.

(3)

If most, or a weighted most, of the $\phi$'s are satisfied by one unique object y, then y is the referent of `X.'

(4)

If the vote yields no unique object, `X' does not refer.

(5)

The statement, `If X exists, then X has most of the $\phi$'s' is known a priori by the speaker.

(6)

The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the $\phi$'s' expresses a necessary truth (in the idiolect of the speaker).

(C)

For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themselves involve the notion of reference in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminate.

In fact, I believe that this distorts anything that Searle says and that it isn't a coherent theory of the meaning of names, no matter how construed, but we'll see how this unfolds.