Beginning from his holism, Quine directs our attention to a relatively simple case. Suppose there is a language, L1, which contains an expression, ``ne ...rein,'' let's say, which can be translated in more than one way into some other language, L2. On the one hand, we could, translate ``ne'' as ``not'' and ``rein'' as ``anything;'' on the other hand, we could translate ``rein'' as ``nothing'' and construe ``ne'' as redundant, or as a marker to the listener, reader that something is going to happen at the end of the verb that they need to pay attention to; or on the third hand, we could treat ``ne ...rein'' as a single word, meaning ``nothing,'' which happens to divide to take a verb in the middle. Any of these treatments work equally well.
This is, Quine notes, a trivial example. It's main function is to show that the precise way we treat words and expressions is not fixed. Insofar as we may prefer one over the other, it's not because the logic of the language demands it; rather, it's because of some other factor. For example, if we want to minimize the number of pleonasts in language, we'll lean toward the first or third treatment over the second; if we want words to behave uniformly across language, in this case not divide in some range of cases, we'll favor the first or second to the third, and so on. All of these are fine reasons, but none of them is based on some doctrine of realism in meaning.
Having softened us up a bit, he moves on to the heart of the argument. Remember Word and Object where Quine presents an extended argument to prove indeterminacy. The problem is that there is nothing to distinguish rabbits from undetached rabbit parts--not only nothing in my head, nothing in my language, but nothing in the world that can do this.
...a whole rabbit is present when and only when an undetached part of a rabbit is present; also when and only when a temporal stage of a rabbit is present (30).
And the same is true for ``rabbithood'' and ``rabbith.'' There is simply no way of differentiating between the proposed translations via ostension. The only difference between the various translations of ``gavagai'' is dependent upon the individuation. Unfortunately, there is no way to determine how the native is individuating. The terms for individuation occur rather deep into the language and are themselves even less susceptible to ostensive treatment, as we have just seen.
Our individuating of terms of divided reference, in English, is bound up with a cluster of interrelated grammatical particles and constructions: plural endings, pronouns, numerals, the ``is'' of identity, and its adaptations ``same'' and ``other.''...If in his language we could ask the native ``Is this gavagai the same as that one?'' while making appropriate multiple ostensions, then indeed we would be well on our way to deciding between ``rabbit,'' ``undetached rabbit part,'' and ``rabbit stage'' (32-3).
But, even though this is what the linguist eventually does, the method ``does not in principle settle the indeterminacy between ``rabbit,' `undetached rabbit part'...'' and so on. Translate words from the cluster differently, and each of the proposed translations for ``gavagai'' emerges unscathed. No matter whether I identify the meaning of ``rabbit''/``gavagai'' as external (extensionally) or as internal (intensionally), the logical inability to decide once and for all on a translation remains. This is indeterminacy of translation, and it ``cuts across extension and intension alike. The terms `rabbit,' `undetached rabbit part,' and `rabbit stage' differ not only in meaning; they are true of different things. Reference itself proves behaviorally inscrutable'' (35).
The implicit maxim guiding his choice of ``rabbit,'' and similar choices for other native word, in that an enduring and relatively homogeneous object, moving as a whole against a contrasting background, is a likely reference for a short expression. If he were to become conscious of this maxim, he might celebrate it as one of the linguistic universals, or traits of all languages, and he would have no trouble pointing out its psychological plausibility. But he would be wrong: the maxim is his own imposition, toward settling what is objectively indeterminate. It is a very sensible imposition, and I would recommend no other. But I am making a philosophical point (34).